Filtered by vendor Goauthentik
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Total
10 CVE
| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v2 | CVSS v3 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2024-23647 | 1 Goauthentik | 1 Authentik | 2024-11-21 | N/A | 6.5 MEDIUM |
| Authentik is an open-source Identity Provider. There is a bug in our implementation of PKCE that allows an attacker to circumvent the protection that PKCE offers. PKCE adds the code_challenge parameter to the authorization request and adds the code_verifier parameter to the token request. Prior to 2023.8.7 and 2023.10.7, a downgrade scenario is possible: if the attacker removes the code_challenge parameter from the authorization request, authentik will not do the PKCE check. Because of this bug, an attacker can circumvent the protection PKCE offers, such as CSRF attacks and code injection attacks. Versions 2023.8.7 and 2023.10.7 fix the issue. | |||||
| CVE-2024-21637 | 1 Goauthentik | 1 Authentik | 2024-11-21 | N/A | 7.6 HIGH |
| Authentik is an open-source Identity Provider. Authentik is a vulnerable to a reflected Cross-Site Scripting vulnerability via JavaScript-URIs in OpenID Connect flows with `response_mode=form_post`. This relatively user could use the described attacks to perform a privilege escalation. This vulnerability has been patched in versions 2023.10.6 and 2023.8.6. | |||||
| CVE-2023-48228 | 1 Goauthentik | 1 Authentik | 2024-11-21 | N/A | 7.5 HIGH |
| authentik is an open-source identity provider. When initialising a oauth2 flow with a `code_challenge` and `code_method` (thus requesting PKCE), the single sign-on provider (authentik) must check if there is a matching and existing `code_verifier` during the token step. Prior to versions 2023.10.4 and 2023.8.5, authentik checks if the contents of `code_verifier` is matching only when it is provided. When it is left out completely, authentik simply accepts the token request with out it; even when the flow was started with a `code_challenge`. authentik 2023.8.5 and 2023.10.4 fix this issue. | |||||
| CVE-2023-46249 | 1 Goauthentik | 1 Authentik | 2024-11-21 | N/A | 9.6 CRITICAL |
| authentik is an open-source Identity Provider. Prior to versions 2023.8.4 and 2023.10.2, when the default admin user has been deleted, it is potentially possible for an attacker to set the password of the default admin user without any authentication. authentik uses a blueprint to create the default admin user, which can also optionally set the default admin users' password from an environment variable. When the user is deleted, the `initial-setup` flow used to configure authentik after the first installation becomes available again. authentik 2023.8.4 and 2023.10.2 fix this issue. As a workaround, ensure the default admin user (Username `akadmin`) exists and has a password set. It is recommended to use a very strong password for this user, and store it in a secure location like a password manager. It is also possible to deactivate the user to prevent any logins as akadmin. | |||||
| CVE-2023-39522 | 1 Goauthentik | 1 Authentik | 2024-11-21 | N/A | 5.3 MEDIUM |
| goauthentik is an open-source Identity Provider. In affected versions using a recovery flow with an identification stage an attacker is able to determine if a username exists. Only setups configured with a recovery flow are impacted by this. Anyone with a user account on a system with the recovery flow described above is susceptible to having their username/email revealed as existing. An attacker can easily enumerate and check users' existence using the recovery flow, as a clear message is shown when a user doesn't exist. Depending on configuration this can either be done by username, email, or both. This issue has been addressed in versions 2023.5.6 and 2023.6.2. Users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this issue. | |||||
| CVE-2023-36456 | 1 Goauthentik | 1 Authentik | 2024-11-21 | N/A | 8.3 HIGH |
| authentik is an open-source Identity Provider. Prior to versions 2023.4.3 and 2023.5.5, authentik does not verify the source of the X-Forwarded-For and X-Real-IP headers, both in the Python code and the go code. Only authentik setups that are directly accessible by users without a reverse proxy are susceptible to this. Possible spoofing of IP addresses in logs, downstream applications proxied by (built in) outpost, IP bypassing in custom flows if used. This poses a possible security risk when someone has flows or policies that check the user's IP address, e.g. when they want to ignore the user's 2 factor authentication when the user is connected to the company network. A second security risk is that the IP addresses in the logfiles and user sessions are not reliable anymore. Anybody can spoof this address and one cannot verify that the user has logged in from the IP address that is in their account's log. A third risk is that this header is passed on to the proxied application behind an outpost. The application may do any kind of verification, logging, blocking or rate limiting based on the IP address, and this IP address can be overridden by anybody that want to. Versions 2023.4.3 and 2023.5.5 contain a patch for this issue. | |||||
| CVE-2023-26481 | 1 Goauthentik | 1 Authentik | 2024-11-21 | N/A | 9.1 CRITICAL |
| authentik is an open-source Identity Provider. Due to an insufficient access check, a recovery flow link that is created by an admin (or sent via email by an admin) can be used to set the password for any arbitrary user. This attack is only possible if a recovery flow exists, which has both an Identification and an Email stage bound to it. If the flow has policies on the identification stage to skip it when the flow is restored (by checking `request.context['is_restored']`), the flow is not affected by this. With this flow in place, an administrator must create a recovery Link or send a recovery URL to the attacker, who can, due to the improper validation of the token create, set the password for any account. Regardless, for custom recovery flows it is recommended to add a policy that checks if the flow is restored, and skips the identification stage. This issue has been fixed in versions 2023.2.3, 2023.1.3 and 2022.12.2. | |||||
| CVE-2022-46172 | 1 Goauthentik | 1 Authentik | 2024-11-21 | N/A | 6.4 MEDIUM |
| authentik is an open-source Identity provider focused on flexibility and versatility. In versions prior to 2022.10.4, and 2022.11.4, any authenticated user can create an arbitrary number of accounts through the default flows. This would circumvent any policy in a situation where it is undesirable for users to create new accounts by themselves. This may also affect other applications as these new basic accounts would exist throughout the SSO infrastructure. By default the newly created accounts cannot be logged into as no password reset exists by default. However password resets are likely to be enabled by most installations. This vulnerability pertains to the user context used in the default-user-settings-flow, /api/v3/flows/instances/default-user-settings-flow/execute/. This issue has been fixed in versions 2022.10.4 and 2022.11.4. | |||||
| CVE-2022-46145 | 1 Goauthentik | 1 Authentik | 2024-11-21 | N/A | 8.1 HIGH |
| authentik is an open-source identity provider. Versions prior to 2022.11.2 and 2022.10.2 are vulnerable to unauthorized user creation and potential account takeover. With the default flows, unauthenticated users can create new accounts in authentik. If a flow exists that allows for email-verified password recovery, this can be used to overwrite the email address of admin accounts and take over their accounts. authentik 2022.11.2 and 2022.10.2 fix this issue. As a workaround, a policy can be created and bound to the `default-user-settings-flow flow` with the contents `return request.user.is_authenticated`. | |||||
| CVE-2022-23555 | 1 Goauthentik | 1 Authentik | 2024-11-21 | N/A | 9.4 CRITICAL |
| authentik is an open-source Identity Provider focused on flexibility and versatility. Versions prior to 2022.11.4 and 2022.10.4 are vulnerable to Improper Authentication. Token reuse in invitation URLs leads to access control bypass via the use of a different enrollment flow than in the one provided. The vulnerability allows an attacker that knows different invitation flows names (e.g. `enrollment-invitation-test` and `enrollment-invitation-admin`) via either different invite links or via brute forcing to signup via a single invitation url for any valid invite link received (it can even be a url for a third flow as long as it's a valid invite) as the token used in the `Invitations` section of the Admin interface does NOT change when a different `enrollment flow` is selected via the interface and it is NOT bound to the selected flow, so it will be valid for any flow when used. This issue is patched in authentik 2022.11.4,2022.10.4 and 2022.12.0. Only configurations that use invitations and have multiple enrollment flows with invitation stages that grant different permissions are affected. The default configuration is not vulnerable, and neither are configurations with a single enrollment flow. As a workaround, fixed data can be added to invitations which can be checked in the flow to deny requests. Alternatively, an identifier with high entropy (like a UUID) can be used as flow slug, mitigating the attack vector by exponentially decreasing the possibility of discovering other flows. | |||||