Filtered by vendor Clastix
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Total
5 CVE
| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v2 | CVSS v3 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2023-48312 | 1 Clastix | 1 Capsule-proxy | 2024-11-21 | N/A | 9.8 CRITICAL |
| capsule-proxy is a reverse proxy for the capsule operator project. Affected versions are subject to a privilege escalation vulnerability which is based on a missing check if the user is authenticated based on the `TokenReview` result. All the clusters running with the `anonymous-auth` Kubernetes API Server setting disable (set to `false`) are affected since it would be possible to bypass the token review mechanism, interacting with the upper Kubernetes API Server. This privilege escalation cannot be exploited if you're relying only on client certificates (SSL/TLS). This vulnerability has been addressed in version 0.4.6. Users are advised to upgrade. | |||||
| CVE-2023-46254 | 1 Clastix | 2 Capsule, Capsule-proxy | 2024-11-21 | N/A | 4.3 MEDIUM |
| capsule-proxy is a reverse proxy for Capsule kubernetes multi-tenancy framework. A bug in the RoleBinding reflector used by `capsule-proxy` gives ServiceAccount tenant owners the right to list Namespaces of other tenants backed by the same owner kind and name. For example consider two tenants `solar` and `wind`. Tenant `solar`, owned by a ServiceAccount named `tenant-owner` in the Namespace `solar`. Tenant `wind`, owned by a ServiceAccount named `tenant-owner` in the Namespace `wind`. The Tenant owner `solar` would be able to list the namespaces of the Tenant `wind` and vice-versa, although this is not correct. The bug introduces an exfiltration vulnerability since allows the listing of Namespace resources of other Tenants, although just in some specific conditions: 1. `capsule-proxy` runs with the `--disable-caching=false` (default value: `false`) and 2. Tenant owners are ServiceAccount, with the same resource name, but in different Namespaces. This vulnerability doesn't allow any privilege escalation on the outer tenant Namespace-scoped resources, since the Kubernetes RBAC is enforcing this. This issue has been addressed in version 0.4.5. Users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this vulnerability. | |||||
| CVE-2022-46167 | 1 Clastix | 1 Capsule | 2024-11-21 | N/A | 8.8 HIGH |
| Capsule is a multi-tenancy and policy-based framework for Kubernetes. Prior to version 0.1.3, a ServiceAccount deployed in a Tenant Namespace, when granted with `PATCH` capabilities on its own Namespace, is able to edit it and remove the Owner Reference, breaking the reconciliation of the Capsule Operator and removing all the enforcement like Pod Security annotations, Network Policies, Limit Range and Resource Quota items. An attacker could detach the Namespace from a Tenant that is forbidding starting privileged Pods using the Pod Security labels by removing the OwnerReference, removing the enforcement labels, and being able to start privileged containers that would be able to start a generic Kubernetes privilege escalation. Patches have been released for version 0.1.3. No known workarounds are available. | |||||
| CVE-2022-23652 | 1 Clastix | 1 Capsule-proxy | 2024-11-21 | 6.5 MEDIUM | 8.8 HIGH |
| capsule-proxy is a reverse proxy for Capsule Operator which provides multi-tenancy in Kubernetes. In versions prior to 0.2.1 an attacker with a proper authentication mechanism may use a malicious `Connection` header to start a privilege escalation attack towards the Kubernetes API Server. This vulnerability allows for an exploit of the `cluster-admin` Role bound to `capsule-proxy`. There are no known workarounds for this issue. | |||||
| CVE-2024-42480 | 1 Clastix | 1 Kamaji | 2024-08-16 | N/A | 9.9 CRITICAL |
| Kamaji is the Hosted Control Plane Manager for Kubernetes. In versions 1.0.0 and earlier, Kamaji uses an "open at the top" range definition in RBAC for etcd roles leading to some TCPs API servers being able to read, write, and delete the data of other control planes. This vulnerability is fixed in edge-24.8.2. | |||||