Total
3 CVE
| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v2 | CVSS v3 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2024-38368 | 1 Cocoapods | 1 Trunk.cocoapods.org | 2024-11-21 | N/A | 9.3 CRITICAL |
| trunk.cocoapods.org is the authentication server for the CoacoaPods dependency manager. A vulnerability affected older pods which migrated from the pre-2014 pull request workflow to trunk. If the pods had never been claimed then it was still possible to do so. It was also possible to have all owners removed from a pod, and that made the pod available for the same claiming system. This was patched server-side in commit 71be5440906b6bdfbc0bcc7f8a9fec33367ea0f4 in September 2023. | |||||
| CVE-2024-38367 | 1 Cocoapods | 1 Trunk.cocoapods.org | 2024-11-21 | N/A | 8.2 HIGH |
| trunk.cocoapods.org is the authentication server for the CoacoaPods dependency manager. Prior to commit d4fa66f49cedab449af9a56a21ab40697b9f7b97, the trunk sessions verification step could be manipulated for owner session hijacking Compromising a victim’s session will result in a full takeover of the CocoaPods trunk account. The threat actor could manipulate their pod specifications, disrupt the distribution of legitimate libraries, or cause widespread disruption within the CocoaPods ecosystem. This was patched server-side with commit d4fa66f49cedab449af9a56a21ab40697b9f7b97 in October 2023. | |||||
| CVE-2024-38366 | 1 Cocoapods | 1 Trunk.cocoapods.org | 2024-11-21 | N/A | 10.0 CRITICAL |
| trunk.cocoapods.org is the authentication server for the CoacoaPods dependency manager. The part of trunk which verifies whether a user has a real email address on signup used a rfc-822 library which executes a shell command to validate the email domain MX records validity. It works via an DNS MX. This lookup could be manipulated to also execute a command on the trunk server, effectively giving root access to the server and the infrastructure. This issue was patched server-side with commit 001cc3a430e75a16307f5fd6cdff1363ad2f40f3 in September 2023. This RCE triggered a full user-session reset, as an attacker could have used this method to write to any Podspec in trunk. | |||||