Total
3 CVE
| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v2 | CVSS v3 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2023-44487 | 32 Akka, Amazon, Apache and 29 more | 311 Http Server, Opensearch Data Prepper, Apisix and 308 more | 2024-11-21 | N/A | 7.5 HIGH |
| The HTTP/2 protocol allows a denial of service (server resource consumption) because request cancellation can reset many streams quickly, as exploited in the wild in August through October 2023. | |||||
| CVE-2021-32783 | 1 Projectcontour | 1 Contour | 2024-11-21 | 5.5 MEDIUM | 8.5 HIGH |
| Contour is a Kubernetes ingress controller using Envoy proxy. In Contour before version 1.17.1 a specially crafted ExternalName type Service may be used to access Envoy's admin interface, which Contour normally prevents from access outside the Envoy container. This can be used to shut down Envoy remotely (a denial of service), or to expose the existence of any Secret that Envoy is using for its configuration, including most notably TLS Keypairs. However, it *cannot* be used to get the *content* of those secrets. Since this attack allows access to the administration interface, a variety of administration options are available, such as shutting down the Envoy or draining traffic. In general, the Envoy admin interface cannot easily be used for making changes to the cluster, in-flight requests, or backend services, but it could be used to shut down or drain Envoy, change traffic routing, or to retrieve secret metadata, as mentioned above. The issue will be addressed in Contour v1.18.0 and a cherry-picked patch release, v1.17.1, has been released to cover users who cannot upgrade at this time. For more details refer to the linked GitHub Security Advisory. | |||||
| CVE-2020-15127 | 1 Projectcontour | 1 Contour | 2024-11-21 | 5.0 MEDIUM | 7.5 HIGH |
| In Contour ( Ingress controller for Kubernetes) before version 1.7.0, a bad actor can shut down all instances of Envoy, essentially killing the entire ingress data plane. GET requests to /shutdown on port 8090 of the Envoy pod initiate Envoy's shutdown procedure. The shutdown procedure includes flipping the readiness endpoint to false, which removes Envoy from the routing pool. When running Envoy (For example on the host network, pod spec hostNetwork=true), the shutdown manager's endpoint is accessible to anyone on the network that can reach the Kubernetes node that's running Envoy. There is no authentication in place that prevents a rogue actor on the network from shutting down Envoy via the shutdown manager endpoint. Successful exploitation of this issue will lead to bad actors shutting down all instances of Envoy, essentially killing the entire ingress data plane. This is fixed in version 1.7.0. | |||||