If an OpenID Connect provider supports the "none" algorithm (i.e., tokens with no signature), pac4j v5.3.0 (and prior) does not refuse it without an explicit configuration on its side or for the "idtoken" response type which is not secure and violates the OpenID Core Specification. The "none" algorithm does not require any signature verification when validating the ID tokens, which allows the attacker to bypass the token validation by injecting a malformed ID token using "none" as the value of "alg" key in the header with an empty signature value.
References
Link | Resource |
---|---|
https://github.com/pac4j/pac4j/commit/22b82ffd702a132d9f09da60362fc6264fc281ae | Patch Third Party Advisory |
https://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-core-1_0.html#IDToken | Product Third Party Advisory |
https://www.pac4j.org/blog/cve_2021_44878_is_this_serious.html | Mitigation Vendor Advisory |
Configurations
Configuration 1 (hide)
|
History
No history.
Information
Published : 2022-01-06 13:15
Updated : 2024-02-28 18:48
NVD link : CVE-2021-44878
Mitre link : CVE-2021-44878
CVE.ORG link : CVE-2021-44878
JSON object : View
Products Affected
pac4j
- pac4j
CWE
CWE-347
Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature