An issue was discovered in uIP 1.0, as used in Contiki 3.0 and other products. The code that parses incoming DNS packets does not validate that the incoming DNS replies match outgoing DNS queries in newdata() in resolv.c. Also, arbitrary DNS replies are parsed if there was any outgoing DNS query with a transaction ID that matches the transaction ID of an incoming reply. Provided that the default DNS cache is quite small (only four records) and that the transaction ID has a very limited set of values that is quite easy to guess, this can lead to DNS cache poisoning.
References
Link | Resource |
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https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ics/advisories/icsa-20-343-01 | Third Party Advisory US Government Resource |
https://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/815128 | Third Party Advisory US Government Resource |
https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ics/advisories/icsa-20-343-01 | Third Party Advisory US Government Resource |
https://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/815128 | Third Party Advisory US Government Resource |
Configurations
Configuration 1 (hide)
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History
21 Nov 2024, 05:08
Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
---|---|---|
References | () https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ics/advisories/icsa-20-343-01 - Third Party Advisory, US Government Resource | |
References | () https://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/815128 - Third Party Advisory, US Government Resource |
Information
Published : 2020-12-11 23:15
Updated : 2024-11-21 05:08
NVD link : CVE-2020-17439
Mitre link : CVE-2020-17439
CVE.ORG link : CVE-2020-17439
JSON object : View
Products Affected
contiki-os
- contiki
uip_project
- uip
CWE
CWE-20
Improper Input Validation