CVE-2019-14356

On Coldcard MK1 and MK2 devices, a side channel for the row-based OLED display was found. The power consumption of each row-based display cycle depends on the number of illuminated pixels, allowing a partial recovery of display contents. For example, a hardware implant in the USB cable might be able to leverage this behavior to recover confidential secrets such as the PIN and BIP39 mnemonic. In other words, the side channel is relevant only if the attacker has enough control over the device's USB connection to make power-consumption measurements at a time when secret data is displayed. The side channel is not relevant in other circumstances, such as a stolen device that is not currently displaying secret data. On Coldcard MK1 and MK2 devices, a side channel for the row-based OLED display was found. The power consumption of each row-based display cycle depends on the number of illuminated pixels, allowing a partial recovery of display contents. For example, a hardware implant in the USB cable might be able to leverage this behavior to recover confidential secrets such as the PIN and BIP39 mnemonic. In other words, the side channel is relevant only if the attacker has enough control over the device's USB connection to make power-consumption measurements at a time when secret data is displayed. The side channel is not relevant in other circumstances, such as a stolen device that is not currently displaying secret data. NOTE: At Coinkite, we’ve already mitigated it, even though we feel strongly that it is not a legitimate issue. In our opinion, it is both unproven (might not even work) and also completely impractical—even if it could be made to work perfectly
Configurations

Configuration 1 (hide)

AND
cpe:2.3:o:coinkite:coldcard_mk1_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
cpe:2.3:h:coinkite:coldcard_mk1:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*

Configuration 2 (hide)

AND
cpe:2.3:o:coinkite:coldcard_mk2_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
cpe:2.3:h:coinkite:coldcard_mk2:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*

History

21 Nov 2024, 04:26

Type Values Removed Values Added
References () https://blog.coinkite.com/noise-troll/ - Patch, Vendor Advisory () https://blog.coinkite.com/noise-troll/ - Patch, Vendor Advisory
References () https://github.com/someone42/hardware-bitcoin-wallet/blob/master/pic32/ssd1306.c - Exploit, Third Party Advisory () https://github.com/someone42/hardware-bitcoin-wallet/blob/master/pic32/ssd1306.c - Exploit, Third Party Advisory

07 Nov 2023, 03:04

Type Values Removed Values Added
Summary ** DISPUTED ** On Coldcard MK1 and MK2 devices, a side channel for the row-based OLED display was found. The power consumption of each row-based display cycle depends on the number of illuminated pixels, allowing a partial recovery of display contents. For example, a hardware implant in the USB cable might be able to leverage this behavior to recover confidential secrets such as the PIN and BIP39 mnemonic. In other words, the side channel is relevant only if the attacker has enough control over the device's USB connection to make power-consumption measurements at a time when secret data is displayed. The side channel is not relevant in other circumstances, such as a stolen device that is not currently displaying secret data. On Coldcard MK1 and MK2 devices, a side channel for the row-based OLED display was found. The power consumption of each row-based display cycle depends on the number of illuminated pixels, allowing a partial recovery of display contents. For example, a hardware implant in the USB cable might be able to leverage this behavior to recover confidential secrets such as the PIN and BIP39 mnemonic. In other words, the side channel is relevant only if the attacker has enough control over the device's USB connection to make power-consumption measurements at a time when secret data is displayed. The side channel is not relevant in other circumstances, such as a stolen device that is not currently displaying secret data. NOTE: At Coinkite, we’ve already mitigated it, even though we feel strongly that it is not a legitimate issue. In our opinion, it is both unproven (might not even work) and also completely impractical—even if it could be made to work perfectly. On Coldcard MK1 and MK2 devices, a side channel for the row-based OLED display was found. The power consumption of each row-based display cycle depends on the number of illuminated pixels, allowing a partial recovery of display contents. For example, a hardware implant in the USB cable might be able to leverage this behavior to recover confidential secrets such as the PIN and BIP39 mnemonic. In other words, the side channel is relevant only if the attacker has enough control over the device's USB connection to make power-consumption measurements at a time when secret data is displayed. The side channel is not relevant in other circumstances, such as a stolen device that is not currently displaying secret data. On Coldcard MK1 and MK2 devices, a side channel for the row-based OLED display was found. The power consumption of each row-based display cycle depends on the number of illuminated pixels, allowing a partial recovery of display contents. For example, a hardware implant in the USB cable might be able to leverage this behavior to recover confidential secrets such as the PIN and BIP39 mnemonic. In other words, the side channel is relevant only if the attacker has enough control over the device's USB connection to make power-consumption measurements at a time when secret data is displayed. The side channel is not relevant in other circumstances, such as a stolen device that is not currently displaying secret data. NOTE: At Coinkite, we’ve already mitigated it, even though we feel strongly that it is not a legitimate issue. In our opinion, it is both unproven (might not even work) and also completely impractical—even if it could be made to work perfectly

Information

Published : 2019-10-31 18:15

Updated : 2024-11-21 04:26


NVD link : CVE-2019-14356

Mitre link : CVE-2019-14356

CVE.ORG link : CVE-2019-14356


JSON object : View

Products Affected

coinkite

  • coldcard_mk2
  • coldcard_mk1
  • coldcard_mk2_firmware
  • coldcard_mk1_firmware
CWE
CWE-203

Observable Discrepancy