The signature verification routine in install.sh in yarnpkg/website through 2018-06-05 only verifies that the yarn release is signed by any (arbitrary) key in the local keyring of the user, and does not pin the signature to the yarn release key, which allows remote attackers to sign tampered yarn release packages with their own key.
References
Configurations
History
21 Nov 2024, 03:45
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| References | () http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/152703/Johnny-You-Are-Fired.html - Third Party Advisory, VDB Entry | |
| References | () http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2019/Apr/38 - Mailing List, Third Party Advisory | |
| References | () https://github.com/RUB-NDS/Johnny-You-Are-Fired - Third Party Advisory | |
| References | () https://github.com/RUB-NDS/Johnny-You-Are-Fired/blob/master/paper/johnny-fired.pdf - Third Party Advisory | |
| References | () https://github.com/yarnpkg/website/commits/master - Third Party Advisory | |
| References | () https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2019/04/30/4 - Mailing List, Third Party Advisory |
Information
Published : 2019-05-16 17:29
Updated : 2024-11-21 03:45
NVD link : CVE-2018-12556
Mitre link : CVE-2018-12556
CVE.ORG link : CVE-2018-12556
JSON object : View
Products Affected
yarnpkg
- website
CWE
CWE-347
Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature