An issue was discovered in HAProxy before 1.8.8. The incoming H2 frame length was checked against the max_frame_size setting instead of being checked against the bufsize. The max_frame_size only applies to outgoing traffic and not to incoming, so if a large enough frame size is advertised in the SETTINGS frame, a wrapped frame will be defragmented into a temporary allocated buffer where the second fragment may overflow the heap by up to 16 kB. It is very unlikely that this can be exploited for code execution given that buffers are very short lived and their addresses not realistically predictable in production, but the likelihood of an immediate crash is absolutely certain.
References
Configurations
History
21 Nov 2024, 03:40
Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
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References | () http://git.haproxy.org/?p=haproxy-1.8.git%3Ba=commit%3Bh=cd117685f0cff4f2f5577ef6a21eaae96ebd9f28 - | |
References | () http://git.haproxy.org/?p=haproxy.git%3Ba=commit%3Bh=3f0e1ec70173593f4c2b3681b26c04a4ed5fc588 - | |
References | () https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2018:1372 - Third Party Advisory |
07 Nov 2023, 02:51
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Information
Published : 2018-05-09 07:29
Updated : 2024-11-21 03:40
NVD link : CVE-2018-10184
Mitre link : CVE-2018-10184
CVE.ORG link : CVE-2018-10184
JSON object : View
Products Affected
redhat
- enterprise_linux
haproxy
- haproxy
CWE
CWE-119
Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer